The Occasional Observer

Although I was very dubious of how an additional 20,000 troops (only a ~14% increase) would actually have any effect in Iraq, I'll gladly be the first to admit my skepticism seems wrong. Besides the anecdotal evidence that I'm seeing far fewer stories about deaths in Iraq since the troop surge, the numbers actually seem to support a significant reduction in violence.

Of course, correlation does not imply causation; it could simply be that the insertion of the additional troops (note that only two of the 5 brigades are actually in place now) came coincidentally at the same time as insurgent activity was going to hit a lull or downstroke anyway, for whatever reason (lack of munitions, lack of people, etc.) Or, it may be that the reduction in violence is attrituable not to the increased number of troops, but rather to their deployment strategy. As the article states:

The tactic of sprinkling U.S. and Iraqi troops like salt across the city — instead of keeping them concentrated in a handful of bases — seems to be paying off so far. "We got down at the people level and are staying," Petraeus told the New York Post.

Another article:

Much of the new strategy looks like the old - armed sweeps through contested areas to kill and capture as many extremists as possible, then install an Iraqi security force to make sure the gunmen don't come back.

This time, however, the Americans plan to stay on after the fighting, maintaining a residual force in the communities to work with Iraqi soldiers and police. As security improves, U.S. and Iraqi civilian authorities will try to restore public services, open banks and revive local economies.

In any case, this begs the question, why wasn't this the policy all along? Without knowing much else, it would seem to be the most logical strategy for rebuilding and fortifying an area. I think Rumsfeld's idea of toppling an area and moving on as quickly as possible during the invasion portion of the war made sense, to get to Baghdad quickly, and prevent the troops from getting bogged down or picked off/surrounded in one area. But this does not seem to be the ideal post-war reconstruction strategy; clearly you need to have a presence remain after you topple an insurgent stronghold. Otherwise, if you leave a vacuum, they will return.