The Occasional Observer

Michael Yon, who knows of which he speaks, sees encouraging signs on the ground:

I know for certain that three things are different in Iraq now from any other time I've seen it.

1. Iraqis are uniting across sectarian lines to drive Al Qaeda in all its disguises out of Iraq, and they are empowered by the success they are having, each one creating a ripple effect of active citizenship.

2. The Iraqi Army is much more capable now than it was in 2005. It is not ready to go it alone, but if we keep working, that day will come.

3. Gen. Petraeus is running the show. Petraeus may well prove to be to counterinsurgency warfare what Patton was to tank battles with Rommel, or what Churchill was to the Nazis.

And yes, in case there is any room for question, Al Qaeda still is a serious problem in Iraq, one that can be defeated. Until we do, real and lasting security will elude both the Iraqis and us.

Bill Kristol agrees that things are getting better, and says that reality is going to handcuff opponents of the war and split the Democratic party:

...the public debate will move from a referendum on Bush's conduct of the war over the past four years to a discussion of the choices ahead, as Gen. Petraeus's testimony in September draws near. The public will finally have to consider seriously the implications of giving up on Iraq, as opposed to supporting the continued prosecution of a war we might well win. This debate should bring home to nervous Republicans in particular the truth that panicked abandonment of the war effort is the worst gambit available to them (to say nothing of the most dishonorable). Meanwhile, Democrats, who have been pandering to their antiwar base, will increasingly see that they have--as the third-ranking Democrat in the House, James Clyburn, acknowledged last week--"a problem." If Petraeus reports progress, Clyburn acknowledged, then "I think there would be enough support" among moderate Democrats "to want to stay the course, and if the Republicans were to stay united as they have been, then it would be a problem for us."

Joe Klein says, "not so fast." Kristol's interpretation of the facts, according to Klein, is glossing over the deeper reality that success in fighting AQII is not the same as restoring order to Iraq, which remains in his view an irreconcilably divided nation:

The U.S. military and the Sunni tribes could drive every last foriegn jihadi out of the country and Iraq would still be in the midst of a deep and profound crisis that might spread into a regional war of Sunnis v. Shi'ites or, more likely, a tribal war of all against all within Iraq.

I am making two assumptions here:

First, I agree with the prevailing analysis of the U.S. intelligence community--an analysis people like Kristol studiously ignore--that the Nuri al-Maliki's national unity government is a complete failure, that there is no immediate prospect of political reconciliation.

Second, that "soft" partition plans like the one offered by Joe Biden and Les Gelb will founder on the notion that Baghdad can stand as a "federal" city. It won't. It will be an ethnically cleansed Shi'ite city before long, probably controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr.